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We present a many-body theory that explains and reproduces recent observations of population 
polarization dynamics, is supported by controlled human experiments, and addresses the 
controversy surrounding the Internet’s impact. It predicts that whether and how a population 
becomes polarized is dictated by the nature of the underlying competition, rather than the validity 
of the information that individuals receive or their online ‘bubbles’. Building on this framework, 
we show that next-generation social media algorithms aimed at pulling people together, will 
instead likely lead to an explosive percolation process that generates new pockets of extremes. 
 
A fascinating debate has opened up about how the Internet impacts societal polarization [1-8] and the 
role of potentially fake news [6]. One might argue, as many commentators do, that social media provide 
an array of fragmented information sources, and that such fragmentation enhances political polarization. 
However, Boxell et al.’s recent empirical study casts doubt on the belief that the Internet and social 
media drive polarization [1], with people who tend to use the Internet and social media the least showing 
high increases in polarization. King et al. [7,8] recently elucidated the power of media information in 
terms of activating people to express themselves. Population polarization is of great practical importance 
since it can manifest itself in the stories that individuals choose to share [3,4], their political affiliation 
and how they vote [5,9], and also how society views scientific findings, e.g. Darwinian evolution versus 
intelligent design, and climate change [10]. Even on issues for which there is no conceivable counter-
evidence, there can be a surprisingly large number of people who take the ‘anti-crowd’ viewpoint, e.g. 
the many people who believe the world is flat and attended the 2017 Flat Earth International Conference 
[11]. Within the sub-population of professional scientists, there is also a non-zero ‘anti-crowd’ that are 
skeptical about global warming [12]. 
 
The challenge of quantifying when and how population polarization develops over time (Fig. 
1B,D,E,G,I,K) and the role of external information, is actually a central one for many disciplines -- from 
physical and chemical systems [13] to social, economic and political domains [14-18]. Foundational 
works in economics by Arthur [19], in physics by Halpin-Healy [20,21], in political science by Lazar 
[4, 16, 17], and in psychology by Forsyth and Lewin [22, 23] and others [24-26], suggest that addressing 
this challenge requires developing minimal, generative theories of a population’s many-body, out-of-
equilibrium dynamics – even though any such theory may be a cartoon version of the real-world socio-
economic and political system [4,16,19,20,21,24-31]. Here we present such a theory (Fig. 2) which 
quantifies conditions for population polarization and its dynamics; is backed up by controlled human 
laboratory experiments (Fig. 2B and Methods and Data); and which reveals the observed polarization 
dynamics as being driven by a many-body collective process that builds crowds and anti-crowds at the 
extremes (Fig. 1A,C,F,H,J, Fig. 2B). Each individual can adapt his/her behavior (i.e. continuous p value 
where 0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 1) in time according to its success, and hence the heterogeneity within the population 
(i.e. distribution P(p,t)) evolves over time. Most existing models maintain the heterogeneity distribution 
as fixed while allowing the location or connectivity to change in some spatial network, or they consider 
individuals having a discrete, binary state (e.g. 0 or 1, spin up or spin down) which can fluctuate while 
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the network location or connections remain fixed [25,29-31]. Such models cannot reproduce or explain 
the time-dependent evolution and shapes of P(p,t) observed in Figs. 1B,D,E,G,I,K and 2B. We also 
predict that the addition of next-generation social media enhancements (Fig. 2C,D) akin to those recently 
proposed by Facebook, will generate a new form of explosive percolation [32] within the population 
(Fig. 3). Although these algorithms can eventually connect together the majority of the population, the 
process will likely generate new pockets of isolated extremes. 
 
Fig. 1: Real-world polarization and theory. A-D: Heterogeneity distribution P(p,t) showing the relative fraction of population having a particular 
p value (i.e. re-scaled alignment using the terminology of Ref. 3. A,C show our theory for R³1 and R<1 respectively, with R near 1. B,D: empirical 
data from Ref. 3 for “hard” and “soft” news respectively. E: other empirical examples from Ref. 5. F,G: theory and empirical data [3] respectively, 
for the percentage of ties per individual type. H,I: theory and empirical data respectively for the time-dependent voting network of Ref. 9. J,K: 
theory and our empirical data (see Methods and Data) respectively for the relative fraction of the two extremes in the Colombian peace process as 
they evolve over time during 2016-2017.  
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Figure 1 shows the favorable comparison between our minimal many-body theory (from Fig. 2A) and 
real-world data, not only for snapshots and time-averages where polarization arises (Fig. 1B,E,G) and 
where it does not (Fig. 1D), but also for the dynamical evolution prior to polarization (Fig. 1I,K). Figure 
2B shows similarly good agreement with the empirical dynamical evolution, but now for our controlled 
laboratory experiment on a smaller population (see Methods and Data). Our theory (Fig. 2A) builds on 
the formal structure introduced by economist W.B. Arthur [19] to explore how humans operate when 
there is no obvious deductive, rational solution for how they each should act [19]. We consider an 
arbitrary number N of heterogeneous, adaptive individuals who are going through life in pursuit of a 
piece of a common ‘pie’ of size L, i.e. a resource or benefit which is neither so small that nobody can 
access it, nor so large that there is no need to try. We do not need to complicate the discussion by 
specifying what that resource or benefit is: it could be material in a socioeconomic context, or reputation, 
prestige or influence in some sociopolitical context, and the population could be a particular sector of 
society or an entity, or a geographic population such as a city, state or country etc.  
Each individual in the population sporadically receives an information update I via news or social media 
source, concerning economic, political and/or social prospects for the population. Despite the age of 
fragmented media [8], the landmark study of King et al. [7] shows that such common information (I) 
remains more influential, relevant and connected to a broad cross-section of the population than might 
otherwise have been thought. The collective dynamics turn out to be insensitive to whether I is presented 
as good (which we encode as 1, suggesting that individuals should step up their efforts to chase L) or 
bad (which we encode as 0, suggesting that individuals should conserve their efforts until the next I 
appears) or if I is true or fake, or anything in between. In the language of physics, I acts as a time-
dependent field. We also do not need to assume this is some zero-sum game or that L or N don’t change 
in time, but for simplicity we focus on L/N~0.5 since this is the “glass half-full-half-empty” scenario 
meaning that there is no a priori bias in terms of how individuals should act, and hence individuals need 
to strategize as to when to step up their efforts (e.g. spend extra energy, money) in pursuit of L. Each 
individual uses his/her current strategy p to decide how to interpret I (i.e. good or bad, true or fake) and 
hence decides whether it is now worth stepping up to chase L and hence risk wasted efforts or not. Each 
strategy 0£p£1 is the probability that the individual takes I at face value and hence acts accordingly: if 
I=1, then with probability p the individual subsequently chases L on the basis that prospects are good 
and so it is worth the risk. If I=0, then with probability p the individual does not risk wasted efforts 
chasing L. During the time until the next I arrives and the process repeats, if the total number of 
individuals actively chasing L is less than L, those individuals consider themselves as having won and 
hence assign a reward R~1 to the reliability score of their particular p. If it is more than L, those 
individuals consider themselves as having lost and hence assign a unit penalty to their p’s reliability 
score – or we can equivalently consider individuals as gradually losing patience with their p and hence 
the reliability score drifts steadily downwards. If an individual’s p has a reliability score that falls below 
some negative value d, he/she adapts by changing their p to a new value either side of the old one (without 
bias). This setup builds directly on prior work in the economics and physics communities [33-40].  
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Fig. 2: A: Theory describes an evolving population of boundedly-rational individuals [19] pursuing individual gain in pursuit of some common 
resource or benefit of size L. Each sporadically receives information I and decides how to act using their individual p value, and changes it when it 
becomes unreliable. The distribution of p values at time t is the heterogeneity distribution P(p,t). B: Evolution of polarization in our controlled 
laboratory experiment (blue line, see Methods and Data) and theory (orange line), with R³1. C,D: Two next-generation social media algorithms 
which actively connect individuals with the aim of promoting alignment and diversity respectively. See Methods and Data for meaning of 𝑪 𝑺𝒊𝒋 . 
E: Our results are insensitive to how these two algorithms are implemented, i.e. choosing 𝒌 individuals (nodes) or 𝝀 links. F: Example flow-chart 
of these two algorithms. 
 
 
Numerical simulation of our theory (Fig. 2A) shows that the heterogeneity distribution P(p;t) evolves 
dynamically in a highly non-trivial way. To the extent that an individual’s p value captures his/her 
ideology, P(p;t) provides a prediction for how the population will collectively act at any given time t in 
terms of, for example, sharing of particular material online or voting. This is supported by the good 
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agreement shown in Figs. 1 and 2B. Our theory reproduces the details of the observed ties from Ref. 3 
(Fig. 1F,G) simply by tracking through time the people with whom each individual shares a similar p 
value. Most importantly, our theory captures the dynamics of the polarization extremes exhibited by the 
U.S. congressional voting data (Fig. 1H,I), the Colombian peace process data (Fig. 1J,K) and our 
controlled laboratory experiments (Fig. 2B). In particular, it reproduces the novel plateau-like structure 
that emerges in Fig. 1K and is hinted at in our experiments in Fig. 2B. This dynamical bottleneck 
represents a temporary slowing-down of the polarization process, which in turn means that there is an 
extended period of time during which the polarization changes little, and hence during which 
interventions could be made to try to reverse the polarization process. This is the first report of such a 
societal polarization bottleneck that we are aware of. Our theory also captures the U and inverted U 
shapes of the steady-state and snapshot results for P(p;t). Whether the population develops a steady-state 
polarized U-shape as in Fig. 1A, is dictated in our theory by the reward to penalty ratio R. A large enough 
R (i.e. R³1) prevents adaptation from being too fast and drives the formation of similarly sized groups 
around the extremes p~1 and p~0 (crowd and anti-crowd). The closer individuals are to p~1 and p~0 
respectively, the more likely they are to take opposite positions from each other. When R<1 
[35,38,39,37,34,36,40] an inverted U emerges (Figs. 1C,D). This provides a parsimonious explanation 
for the findings of Ref. 3 since “hard” news (Fig. 1B) is directly relevant to the current socioeconomic 
climate and hence will be considered as relevant to an individual in deciding whether to pursue L at that 
moment, and hence R would be larger which is consistent with R³1 (Fig. 1A). “Soft” news (Fig. 1D) is 
not directly relevant to the current climate and hence will play less of a role in whether an individual 
decides to pursue L at that moment: hence R would be smaller, consistent with R<1 (Fig. 1C). In stark 
contrast to the key role of R, the emergence of the polarized U-shape is not sensitive to the other 
parameters in the model, i.e. individuals’ threshold value d, the size of the change of p upon adaptation, 
the absolute values of L and N at fixed L/N=0.5, or the nature of the information I. It is also not sensitive 
to (1) whether the information I is fabricated to provide artificially high levels of ‘good’ news (e.g. all 
1’s) or ‘bad’ (e.g. all 0’s), or whether it is true or false, or whether it is released in a certain sequence; 
(2) whether we include population heterogeneity from the outset by randomly assigning p values, or set 
them all equal to 0.5 to mimic maximum initial uncertainty of all individuals; (3) the origin or precise 
nature of I; (4) the amount of clock-time that passes between the new arrival of information I; (5) the 
absolute value of the reward and penalty (only the ratio R is relevant); (6) the way in which individuals 
adapt and hence choose a new p value, as long as they do so independently; (7) whether different sectors 
of the society receive different I and hence exist in different news bubbles. As long as each bubble 
remains self-contained and has the same R, each U or inverted U will just add together and hence preserve 
the same shape; (8) other ‘bubble’ mechanisms, such as allowing individuals with similar p values to 
mimic each other. This applies even if the population gets broken up into only three bubbles. In short, 
while any of these factors may impact the way in which P(p;t) evolves and the time it takes to reach a 
steady-state, they do not affect whether the final P(p;t) is U-shaped or not. Since a U and inverted U are 
symmetric, even a switch in definition of what is extreme ‘left’ and what is extreme ‘right’ would not 
change the resulting P(p;t). We also note that generalizing the characterization of people’s strategies and 
hence ideologies from a single p value to a vector of attributes of arbitrary length, and/or allowing I to 
be a vector, does not change the emergence of crowds and anti-crowds at the extremes [40].  
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Fig. 3: A: Impact of adding links using next-generation algorithm promoting alignment (from Fig. 2C) on the heterogeneity distribution from Fig. 
1B (left-hand side) and from Fig. 1D (right-hand side). Middle panels show circles whose center sits at the average p value for each of the seven 
largest clusters that are formed, and whose radius is proportional to the number of individuals in that cluster. Results shown as a function of the 
increasing fraction of links added. Different colors are used to denote different clusters. In both cases, small isolated clusters appear with more 
extreme average p values away from p=0.5 even when there is a single large cluster formed around p=0.5 and even though the fraction of links 
added is greater than 1.0 so that each individual is included in at least one link on average. Lower panels show snapshots of the actual network, at 
two values of the added-link fraction. The network for the “hard” news heterogeneity distribution (left-hand side) shows that even the single large 
cluster that exists at added-link fraction 1.5 is actually internally highly segregated. It requires only one weak link to be broken in order to fragment 
the cluster into two separate pieces. B: Same as A, but for the next-generation algorithm promoting diversity (from Fig. 2D). In this case, the main 
cluster forms quickly around p=0.5, but it leaves a number of small isolated clusters with more extreme average p values that again survive until a 
surprisingly large fraction of links is added (≫ 𝟏.0).  
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Given Facebook’s summer 2017 announcement of next-generation features that will actively create links 
between people, we now build on the above framework to explore the likely impact that such algorithms 
(Figs. 2C,D) will have starting from the present-day P(p;t) profiles shown in Figs. 1B,D [3]. Since any 
machine-based mechanism can create links quickly once implemented, we assume a quasi-static P(p;t)º 
P(p) while these algorithms are operating. The alignment-algorithm (Fig. 2C) links together individuals 
based on the similarity of their p, and hence promotes the growth of clusters with high internal alignment. 
The diversity-algorithm (Fig. 2D) links together individuals based on the dissimilarity of their p, hence 
promotes the growth of clusters with high internal diversity. We have checked that our results are 
insensitive to exactly how these algorithms operate (Fig. 2E shows two obvious implementations in 
which either a candidate individual (i.e. node) or link is selected, while Fig. 2F shows the flow diagram).  
 
Figure 3 shows that although both algorithms are designed with the intention of pulling together the 
population, several unexpected and potentially undesirable features emerge as the links are added. First, 
isolated residual clusters arise with an internal average p value well away from the population average 
of p=0.5. Indeed, for the alignment-algorithm with either the “hard” or “soft” news P(p), and for the 
diversity-algorithm with the “hard” news P(p), these isolated clusters are extreme in that their average 
internal p value is very close to the extremes p=0 and 1. This is particularly surprising for the alignment-
algorithm in the case of “soft” news, since the “soft” news P(p) population starts off with an average 
p~0.5. Second, these extreme clusters persist even when the fraction of links is ≫ 1.0 and hence each 
individual has on average at least one new link. Third, even though links are added smoothly and 
monotonically by the algorithms, the cluster evolution shows an abrupt temporal evolution akin to 
explosive percolation [32]. Fourth, even though at high enough link fraction ≫ 1.0 the population is 
largely reunited into a single cluster, the network comprising the largest cluster for the “hard” news 
diversity-algorithm is still internally highly segregated (see Fig. 3A left lower panel) meaning that it 
requires only one weak link to be broken in order for the population to fragment into two disconnected 
pieces.  
 
In addition to the mechanisms in Figs. 2C,D providing plausible representations of next-generation 
algorithms, there is empirical evidence that our theory in Fig. 2A provides a plausible representation of 
human behavior. In addition to Arthur’s original real-world observation [19], this evidence comprises: 
(1) The controlled laboratory experiments carried out by one of us [33] featuring the same setup of N 
individuals repeatedly deciding whether to access a common resource L<N. This controlled laboratory 
experiment differs from Axelrod’s Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments [41] in that it has a formal structure, 
it provides a tangible incentive for the individuals, and it uses the same subjects throughout. It makes no 
a priori assumptions about the structure of the learning dynamics. By focusing on the choice of a strategy 
as in our theory, it also differs from the standard economics experiment in which a subject chooses a 
single action during a round of play [42]. In accordance with our theory, these experiments show that 
individuals are heterogeneous in terms of strategies used; that they adopt different strategies over time 
based on their past success; that they show a tendency over time to move away from more complex 
mixed or conditional behaviors toward simpler strategies given R³1, i.e. ‘always’ in Ref. 33 which is 
akin to p~1 and p~0 and which also happen to become the most successful strategies in our theory (see 
later); that individuals do not manage to collectively find a more optimal solution (e.g. implicitly taking 
turns) but instead continually compete. A different set of experiments which also support these 
mechanisms, was carried out by Stanley et al. [43]. (2) The controlled real-world experiments of 
Konstantakopoulos et al. [44-46] feature N individuals trying to access limited common lighting L<N 
and being rewarded accordingly. Though now in a real-world office setting, the findings are again 
consistent with our theory. (3) The uncontrolled real-world phenomenon of financial trading, in 
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particular Refs. 47,48, again confirms that, like our theory, the most popular and successful strategies 
turn out to be the ‘always’ type (e.g. momentum akin to p~1 and contrarian akin to p~0). Moreover, this 
was shown both for the case of humans choosing strategies when trading for themselves, and when 
choosing algorithms to write for machine trading. Other empirical studies with similar results include 
studies of drivers repeatedly deciding whether to access a potentially congested route [49].  
 
We now provide mathematics that helps explain and quantify the process of population polarization, and 
hence our findings in Fig. 1. We adopt three complementary perspectives which have been used 
successfully for physical systems: few-body, N-body statistical, and large-N dynamical. (1) Few-body: 
Since three is typically the minimum number of degrees of freedom for which complex dynamics can 
arise in a system, consider N=3 individuals (or three groups sharing a common p value) and three possible 
p values: 0, 0.5 and 1. Halpin-Healy [20,21] showed how such a ‘three-body’ theory in a comparable 
setting of conformity and dissent can provide a powerful quantitative description. Computer simulations 
of this N=3 version of Fig. 2A reproduce similar U and inverted U-shapes as for general N. There are 
33=27 possible microstates (i.e. arrangements of the N=3 individuals among the 3 p values) [34], as 
shown in the SM. A microstate (n0, n0.5, n1) denotes n0 individuals with p=0, n0.5 with p=0.5 and n1 with 
p=1, and each provides a certain average payoff per individual after accounting for rewards and penalties. 
For R=1, the highest payoff microstates are (1,1,1) which is 6-fold degenerate, i.e. 6 arrangements of the 
individuals 1,2 and 3, and (1,0,2) and (2,0,1) which are each 3-fold degenerate. Even though the 
population macrostate (U-shape as in Fig. 1A) appears static, the population continually transitions 
between these 12 microstates since individuals keep sporadically changing their p values – albeit at 
different rates – since there is no p value which is so good that it guarantees never needing adaptation. 
We can therefore take an average over time, to provide a theoretical prediction of the imbalance in 
heterogeneity. Assuming that all these microstates are visited equally, it follows that P(p) should have a 
U-shape in which P(0)= P(1)=2.5 P(0.5). Since the same is true for any set of three individuals, the 
general N population will also have a U-shape. Though the ratio is larger in the continuous-p, large-N 
case, this finding is consistent with the simulations (Fig. 1A). Moreover as in the simulations with large 
N, individuals with p~0 and p~1 retain their p value for a very long time while those with p~0.5 continue 
to adapt most quickly. R>1 behaves similarly. R<1 favors microstates such as (0,3,0) and hence an 
inverted-U. (2) N-body statistical: Counting the probabilities for how adaptation takes individuals in and 
out of a specific region of p-space, an argument parallel to that of Ref. 36 (see SM) yields the following 
general expression: 𝑃 𝑝 = 𝐴 12 − 𝑝𝐹56 − 1 − 𝑝 𝐹57 + 2𝑝 1 − 𝑝 𝐺5;1 ;1  (1) 
where explicit expressions for 𝐹56 , 𝐹57 , 𝐺5;1  are derived in the SM, and A is determined by the 
normalization condition that P(p) integrates to unity. Despite their complex mathematical forms, the 
terms appearing in Eq. (1) have a simple interpretation that elucidates why and when population 
polarization emerges. Consider an individual who is merely observing this theoretical ‘rat race’ and 
hence not adding to the demand for L. The probability that their p-value wins at any given instance, is 
given by ½ corrected by the second and third terms on the right-hand side. The fourth term is the one 
that accounts for their own impact in the system, just like a driver adds to the likelihood of a jam by 
being present on the road or a buyer inadvertently raises the asking price of an item simply by showing 
interest. When it is large enough, it can cause the inverted U-shape P(p) to flip into a U-shape P(p). (3) 
Large-N dynamical: Using an argument paralleling Ref. 37, it can be shown that P(p;t) in the large-N 
and continuous-time limit, satisfies a generalized diffusion equation <= >;@<@ = <AB = >;@<>A  where f [..] is a 
functional of P(p;t) and hence describes the evolution of P(p;t) in time. Additional analysis then becomes 
possible using the time-dependent random-walk work of Refs. 38-40. Though P(p;t) cannot be obtained 
in closed form, the competition between the emergence of a U-shape and inverted U-shape in the long-
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time limit is reflected in the fluctuations (variance) given by 𝑁 𝑝 1 − 𝑝 𝑃 𝑝; 𝑡 𝑑𝑝1F , which has 
extrema when P(p;t) is localized around p=0.5 and when P(p;t) is localized around p=0 and p=1. The 
time-dependence of the polarization can be captured by a mean field-like equation for the rate-of-change 
of the fraction x(t) of the population in the crowd and anticrowd: 𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑡 = 𝑟 + 𝑎 𝑥 − 𝑥F 2 where 𝑟 is 
the average growth rate, and the quadratic term is a self-interaction term. We estimate 𝑥F~KL  which is 
the approximate fraction of the population not in the crowd or anticrowd when P(p;t) is flat. For 𝑟 > 0, 
there is a saddle-node ghost at 𝑥~𝑥F [50] hence x(t) initially increases fast from 𝑥 0 ~0, then forms a 
bottleneck, plateau shape around 𝑥 𝑡 ~𝑥F before accelerating again – as observed in the real population 
polarization during the Colombian peace process in Fig. 1K, in the controlled human laboratory 
experiments in Fig. 2B, and in our theory in Figs. 1J and 2B. The time spent by the population in the 
bottleneck can be obtained by integrating 𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑡 to give approximately 𝑎𝜋 𝑟 which diverges as 𝑟 →0. This suggests that even in a population that is in the process of polarizing, there will be an extended 
intermediate interval of time during which intervention could be introduced to push the system 
polarization in the other direction. 
 
In the future, as new features are proposed to enhance the technology and connectivity of online media, 
the appropriate network connections can be added into the simulations and incorporated into the above 
mathematical analysis within a mean-field approximation. This will allow predictions to be made about 
the likely impact of new social media features on the population polarization, and hence appropriate 
adjustments can be made before it is launched. 
 
 
Methods and Data 
Our controlled laboratory experiment (Fig. 2B) to test the theory (Fig. 2A) was implemented by one of 
us with full detailed documentation available online [33]. The computer simulation of our theory in Fig. 
2A is straightforward and builds on existing software that is freely available for Arthur’s El Farol 
problem [19]. To run simulations within any browser and without requiring any programming skills, see 
http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/models/ElFarol. For instructions on how to modify this simulation 
code, see http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.60.7968&rep=rep1&type=pdf.  
Our data from the Colombian peace process comes from the public posts of the 218 Facebook collective 
profiles (i.e. groups and pages, but not private individual accounts) identified through online trawling, 
whose discussions were centered on the peace talks between the State and Marxist guerrillas. The data 
capture methodology copies exactly the approach introduced and discussed in depth in Ref. 51. The data 
was captured through Facebook’s API for the period between September 2012 and February 2017. Each 
collective was coded according to its polarity (i.e. supporters, opponents, or neutral discussants of the 
peace policies). The logs comprise more than 4 million messages, that were processed to identify the 
number of unique commenters (i.e. those who posted at least once), per month, per polarity. While 
Schelling’s segregation model (SSM) [25,29-31] also produces U-shapes, the underlying mechanisms 
and assumptions are completely different: in SSM, individuals locally try to be in the majority whereas 
in the present theory they are competing for L and do not require any local geographic connectivity; in 
the SSM the decision is made based on the present state of the system and is deterministic, while in the 
present theory the decision is stochastic based on a probability p; in the SSM, the individuals have no 
memory whereas in the present theory they record the scores of their p values, and also can include 
memory of the past without changing the conditions under which a U-shape emerges; the SSM is scale-
dependent, i.e. the segregation emerges depending on how the agents choose their boundaries which 
implies local alignment rules, while the present theory is scale-free and independent of any geometry; 
the present theory can produce a U-shape or an inverted U by varying R, but in the SSM even if all 
individual agents have a strict preference for perfect integration, best-response dynamics may lead to 
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segregation. The next-generation algorithms in Fig. 2C,D are implemented as follows: The mechanisms 
of link addition follow directly from the relationship among the p values associated to the individuals 
(i.e. nodes) to be linked. This is quantified by the similarity 𝑆QR between individual i and individual j 
which is defined as 𝑆QR = 1 − 𝑝Q − 𝑝R . Thus highly similar individuals are close to each other in the p 
distribution, and otherwise for highly dissimilar individuals. The mechanisms of link addition depend 
on the coalescence function 𝐶 𝑆QR . The alignment-algorithm (Fig. 2C) favors connecting similar 
individuals. The diversity-algorithm (Fig. 2D) favors connecting dissimilar individuals. A 
system following the alignment-algorithm tends to form clusters of alike individuals while diversity-
algorithm tends to form clusters with unlike or complementary individuals. Hence, for the alignment-
algorithm a coalescence function is defined as 𝐶 𝑆QR = 𝑆QR while for the diversity-algorithm, 𝐶 𝑆QR =1 − 𝑆QR. The present state, i.e. prior to any next-generation algorithms, has no additional links. At each 
timestep, a sample from the system is randomly selected and a new link is established between the pair of 
individuals that maximizes the coalescence function	𝐶 𝑆QR . Though the sampling can be either of 
individuals (i.e. nodes) or links, the evolution of the network presents similar properties.  
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